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Introduction 
When to claim Social Security is one of the most im-
portant decisions Americans make when approaching 
retirement.  Currently, retirees can choose between 
claiming at the Full Retirement Age1 and receiving 
full benefits, claiming as early as age 62 but receiv-
ing reduced benefits, or delaying retirement to as 
late as age 70 and collecting higher monthly benefits.  
The reductions and the delayed retirement credits 
are approximately actuarially fair for the person with 
average life expectancy.  Early retirement benefits are 
lowered by an amount that offsets the longer period 
for which they will be received.  The delayed retire-
ment option offers higher benefits but for a shorter 
remaining lifetime.  Thus, on average, workers will 
receive the same lifetime benefits regardless of when 
they claim between the ages of 62 and 70. 
Recently, several unconventional claiming strate-
gies have come to light that have the potential to 
pay higher lifetime benefits to some individuals and 
increase system costs.2   This brief focuses on one of 
these strategies, which we call the “Free Loan from 
Social Security” strategy.  The first section outlines the 
procedure and incentives of employing this strategy.  
The second section, using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study, presents estimates of the cost to 
Social Security under three different scenarios and 
describes who would gain.  The final section con-
cludes that the estimated annual $5.5 billion to $11.0 
billion cost of allowing free loans from Social Security 
is likely to increase substantially over time.  
Free Loan from Social 
Security
This strategy originates from a little-known part of the 
law that allows individuals who are already collecting 
benefits to change their minds and start over.3  For ex-
ample, an individual can claim Social Security at age 
62 and then reclaim at age 70 and receive a higher 
benefit, provided he pays back the benefits he has 
received.  Because the claimant is only required to re-
turn the nominal amount of the collected benefits, he 
could invest the money that he receives and keep the 
interest.4  In essence, the claimant is a borrower who 
is required to pay back only the principal of a “loan,” 
making this strategy akin to an interest-free loan from 
Social Security.  An individual with average life expec-
By Alicia H. Munnell, Alex Golub-Sass, and Nadia Karamcheva*age 70.  As already noted, under conventional claim-
ing strategies Social Security is actuarially fair.  In 
other words, the average retired individual with a life 
expectancy of 83 will receive the same lifetime bene-
fits no matter what age between 62 and 70 he claims.  
In Figure 1, areas A and B show the benefits received 
if the individual claims at 62, while areas C and B are 
the benefits received if claiming at 70.  The value of 
area A, the benefits earned before 70, is equal to the 
value of area C, the change in benefits due to delayed 
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tancy will increase his lifetime benefits by the amount 
of the investment earnings.  Should the claimant die 
before reaching average life expectancy, this strategy 
will involve a loss.  But the strategy always dominates 
simply claiming at age 70 because it provides “early 
retirement” benefit payments for those who die prior 
to age 70 and the additional interest for those who 
“repay the loan” and reclaim at 70. 
An example might help.  Based on Social Security 
life tables, the average 62-year old born in 1944 has 
a life expectancy of approximately 21 years.  His Full 
Retirement Age is 66, at which point he is entitled to 
100 percent of his primary insurance amount (PIA).5  
If he opts for early retirement at 62, he will receive 
75 percent of his PIA; if he postpones retirement past 
66, he will accrue delayed retirement credits, culmi-
nating in a maximum benefit of 132 percent of PIA at 
Figure 1. Percent of PIA Received with the 
“Free Loan” Strategy, by Age
Note: This example assumes an individual with a Full 
Retirement Age of 66 and life expectancy of 21 years at age 
62.  Because the figure does not show the present discount-
ed value of future benefits, area A does not equal area C. 
Source: Authors’ illustration.
retirement.  If that same individual takes advantage of 
the “Free Loan from Social Security” strategy he will 
collect benefits equal to area A and earn interest on A 
equal to A´, but he needs to pay back only area A.  In 
total, then, this individual would end up with a Social 
Security benefit equal to areas B and C and an invest-
ment gain equal to A´.6   The gain to the individual and 
the loss to the system is therefore the value of A´.
The implication from Figure 1 is that any individ-
ual with average life expectancy – age 83 – will benefit 
from implementing this strategy and his gain is area 
A´.  But some individuals whose life expectancy is 
lower than the average can also benefit.  Assume that 
the individual who claimed at 70 adopts the “Free 
Loan” strategy.  He first claims at 62, invests the 
benefits paid to him, and reclaims at 70.  As noted 
above, reclaiming at 70 requires the individual to pay 
back the value of the benefits received over the prior 
eight years, but not the interest.  Keeping the interest 
gives him a ‘head-start’ on reaching the break-even 
age compared to an individual claiming at 62 under 
the conventional strategy.  To break-even, he simply 
needs to live until he receives total benefits from 
Social Security that, together with the interest, add up 
to the total benefits received by a conventional age-62 
claimant.  Because of the interest earnings, this point 
occurs at age 81.7 
Cost to the System
The gains to individuals imply a cost to the Social Se-
curity system.  To calculate the total cost to the system 
we use the earnings data from the Health and Retire-
ment Study, a nationally representative survey of older 
Americans, to estimate each respondent’s PIA and his 
potential welfare gain.8  In our most conservative sce-
nario, we calculate the cost assuming every individual 
aged 70 who is likely to benefit from the strategy in 
2006 takes advantage of it.9  To estimate the potential 
annual cost – defined as the lifetime cost for 70-year-
olds in each year – we assume that every 70-year-old 
has previously claimed benefits at age 62 and is now 
facing the decision on whether to employ this strategy.   
For simplicity, we assume that retiring spouses with a 
work history – who might normally receive a spousal 
benefit – claim benefits based on their own earnings 
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Life Expectancy Only
As we already saw, the strategy is only beneficial if 
the participant who reclaims at 70 lives long enough 
such that the value of the higher delayed retirement 
benefits, plus A´ (from Figure 1), exceeds the value of 
the benefits returned at age 70.  (Box 1 describes the 
potential losses for those with shorter life expectancy).   
Because we are unaware of every individual’s subjec-
tive mortality at age 70, we assign probabilities of 
living to the breakeven age based on each individual’s 
gender, race, and educational attainment.  We then 
multiply each person’s potential gain by the prob-
ability that the individual will be alive at age 81 to 
determine the expected loss to the system.10  Based on 
these probabilities and assuming that all individuals 
age 70 in 2006 had previously claimed Social Secu-
rity benefits at age 62, the expected cost to the system 
would have been $11.0 billion (equivalent to area A´ 
in Figure 1).  Total costs would actually be higher be-
cause delayed claiming would increase survivor bene-
fits for couples.  Moreover, many women are eligible 
to receive a spousal benefit based on their husband’s 
earnings.  Applying the “Free Loan” strategy to spou-
sal benefits has the potential to further increase the 
cost to Social Security.11 
Moderate Financial Constraints
Not everyone healthy enough to gain from the 
strategy will be able to implement it.  Many individu-
als face considerable financial constraints.  Since 
a retiree cannot use his Social Security benefit if it 
is being invested, he must have enough wealth to 
live on while employing this strategy.  We therefore 
restrict the sample of potential participants in the 
strategy to include only individuals who have net 
worth of at least twice the amount that they would 
need to repay at age 70, less the earned interest.  The 
resulting estimated cost to the system would then be 
about $8.7 billion.
Strict Financial Constraints
The moderate financial constraint assumes that all 
of an individual’s net worth will be available as a 
financial resource for implementing the strategy.  In 
practice, one can see how assets such as real estate, 
vehicles, or businesses would not be liquid enough to 
be viable financial resources for utilizing this strate-
gy.  Thus, we further restricted the sample to include 
only individuals who are likely to possess financial 
assets twice the amount needed to repay at 70 minus 
earned interest.  The total cost to the system then 
drops to $5.5 billion (see Figure 3 on the next page).
There is a distinct possibility that financial insti-
tutions could worsen the situation for Social Security.   
An opportunity exists for lenders to loan money to 
those individuals who are financially ineligible for 
the strategy in exchange for a portion of their poten-
tial increase in benefits.
Who Will Actually Benefit?
The wealth and life expectancy required for this strat-
egy limit its use.  In terms of life expectancy, roughly 
60 percent of men and 70 percent of women at age 
70 are expected to live long enough to break-even 
on this strategy.  Adjusting for moderate financial 
constraints will cause the percent of men and women 
Box 1. Potential for Loss
 
This “Free Loan” strategy also raises the specter of 
potential loss to individuals who die shortly after 
repaying their age 62-70 benefits.  For an individual 
with the median benefit, the loss starts at $62,000 
– the required repayment of benefits – and declines 
steadily until he reaches his break-even age.
Figure 2. Loss Experienced by Employing “Free 
Loan” Strategy, by Age of Death, Thousands of 
Dollars
Sources: Authors’ calculations from University of Michi-
gan, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 2006; and U.S. 
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Figure 3. Total Cost to Social Security, Billions 
of Dollars
Sources: Authors’ calculations from 2006 HRS; and 2006 
CPS.
who take advantage of the strategy to drop to 46 
percent and 56 percent, respectively; strict financial 
constraints will lower the share to 30 percent for men 
and 32 percent for women.
Good health and financial assets are not randomly 
distributed in the population.  As a result, most of 
the $5.5 billion of expected gains under strict finan-
cial constraints are very concentrated – they accrue 
to individuals in the top two quintiles of the wealth 
distribution (see Figure 4).  Therefore, the “Free Loan 
from Social Security” strategy creates more inequity 
between those who can afford their retirement and 
those who are at risk of not being financially prepared 
to retire.
Conclusion
With the aging of the population, Social Security is 
facing shortfalls that will require modifications to 
the current system.  Therefore, policymakers will be 
looking for ways to trim costs.  Social Security was 
not designed to give zero-interest loans to those who 
can afford to retire without their monthly benefit.  
The $5.5 billion to $11.0 billion annual gain to high-
income households will result in a comparable cost to 
the Social Security program.  
Moreover, the system could be at even greater 
risk in the future because the number of people who 
could take advantage of the zero-interest loan strategy 
will increase for three reasons.  First, as the popula-
tion ages, there will be more people claiming Social 
Security.  Second, the rise in the Full Retirement Age 
reduces benefits, which also reduces the amount 
that individuals would need to pay back if adopting 
this strategy.  Third, due largely to the shift to 401(k) 
plans, future cohorts will have more liquid assets 
available to take advantage of this strategy.  In short, 
the potential cost of this strategy will continue to rise 
and Social Security will be left with the bill.
Figure 4. Potential Gain Under Strict Financial
Constraints, by Wealth Quintile, Billions of 
Dollars


































quintileAPPENDIXCalculation of the Cost of the 
“Free Loan” Strategy
The analysis is based on 392 individuals age 70 in the 
2006 Health and Retirement Study (HRS).12  The HRS 
restricted and self-reported earnings data make it pos-
sible to calculate Social Security’s primary insurance 
amounts (PIAs) and household wealth at age 70 for 
each individual.  
The PIA is used to calculate the amount of inter-
est recipients could have earned if they had initially 
claimed Social Security benefits at age 62 and then 
reclaimed at a later age.  The assumed interest rate 
is 3 percent.  (To estimate steady state annual costs, 
we assumed a Full Retirement Age of 66 and delayed 
retirement credits of 8 percent for each year ben-
efits are postponed.  The analysis also assumes that 
individuals make claiming decisions independently 
of their spouses.)  Although people younger than 70 
could take advantage of the ability to reclaim (that is, 
a person could claim at 62 and then reclaim at 64), 
we think that evaluating the extreme case of claiming 
at 62 and reclaiming at 70 provides a clear minimum 
cost to the system. 
To identify those individuals who would gain by 
pursuing the reclaiming strategy, we would like to 
have the life expectancy for each individual.  While 
the HRS reports the individual’s assessment of his or 
her probability of living to a given age, this informa-
tion does not easily translate into subjective life expec-
tancy.  Thus, we adopted an alternative strategy that 
began with data from the Social Security Cohort Life 
Tables showing that, at age 70, 60 percent of men 
and 70 percent of women will live to 81.  We then 
used relative mortality rates for 12 gender-race-edu-
cation categories from Brown, Liebman, and Pollet 
(2002) to calculate the probability of each individual 
living to the break-even age of 81.13
To calculate the potential gain to the entire 70 
year-old cohort, we multiplied each individual’s po-
tential gain by the probability that he or she would be 
alive at age 81.  The HRS weights were then applied 
to calculate averages for the entire population age 
70 in 2006.  The total cost to Social Security is then 
found by multiplying those averages by the actual 
number of men and women age 70 from the 2006 
Current Population Survey.
The next step is to identify those individuals who 
have the required assets to exercise this strategy.  
This calculation requires a series of assumptions.  
First, in the case of couples, if benefit information 
for the spouse is not available, we assume that the 
head of house has access to all the household’s as-
sets.  Second, if benefit information for the spouse 
is available, we assume that the couple will choose to 
exercise both the husband’s and the wife’s strategy 
subject to their financial means.  If the couple lacks 
the resources to pay back both benefits, the couple 
will choose to repay the higher benefit.  If the couple 
cannot afford to repay the higher benefit, it will repay 
the lower benefit to the extent feasible.
With these assumptions, we impose two alter-
native financial constraints.  Under the moderate 
constraint, we limit those who can take advantage of 
this strategy to individuals with total assets in excess 
of twice their age 62-70 benefits.  Under the more 
restrictive constraint, we define assets to include only 
financial wealth.  Based on these restrictions, we cal-
culate the percent of financially unconstrained men 
and women and their mean gain from the strategy. 
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Endnotes
1   The Full Retirement Age (FRA) is scheduled to 
increase from age 65 to age 67 by 2022.  The increase 
began with individuals born in 1938, for whom the 
FRA is 65 plus 2 months, and increases 2 months 
per year until it reaches age 66.  Then after a 12-year 
hiatus, the FRA again increases by 2 months per year 
until it reaches age 67 for individuals born in 1960 or 
later.
2  See Kotlikoff (2008) and Hershey (2008).
3  This claiming approach had its origins in the case 
of an individual who initially claimed benefits in 
1957 and later requested that she be allowed to re-file 
in 1964 in order to obtain a higher monthly benefit 
based on her more recent work history and older fil-
ing age.  The Social Security Administration granted 
this request on the grounds that it was in the best 
interest of the claimant to rescind the original claim.
4  The amount that needs to be repaid includes any 
Medicare premiums deducted from the benefit the 
individual received.
5  The PIA is the benefit available at a worker’s Full 
Retirement Age.
6  The correct comparison of lifetime benefits re-
quires discounting, which was ignored in the graphi-
cal analysis for the sake of readability.
7  The original break-even age is calculated by finding 
the time T at which
where Ben62 is the benefit level an individual re-
ceives beginning at age 62, Ben70 is the benefit level 
an individual receives beginning at age 70, and d is 
the discount rate.  Because, under the “Free Loan” 
strategy, individuals are permitted to keep the interest 
they earn on their benefits, the new break-even age is 
calculated by finding the time T at which 
where I is the interest earned on benefits between the 





















8  To present a static annual cost, PIA adjustments 
for individuals aged 70 in 2006 were calculated to 
coincide with future cohorts.
9  Individuals in poor health who do not plan on liv-
ing to the break-even age have the option of paying 
back their benefit before age 70.  If an individual had 
previously planned on claiming at the FRA, he still 
gains from claiming at 62 and reclaiming at the FRA.  
The individual still gains the interest payments, mak-
ing the strategy attractive to those who may not live 
into their 80s.
10  For more details, please see Appendix.
11  Note that spousal benefits max out at age 66 
since these benefits do not accrue delayed retirement 
credits.
12  To check the validity of our sample size, we aug-
mented our sample to 813 by projecting the wealth 
of individuals age 69 by one year and treating them 
as if they were age 70.  The resulting cost from our 
inflated sample was comparable to our initial result.
13  If an individual did not fall into one of the 12 
groups, they were assigned gender-specific cohort 
mortality.
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